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Abstract  
This paper illustrates the substantial role of non-criminal justice bodies in punishing persons 
for fraud related behaviours in England and Wales. It illustrates the substantial role of 
government regulators, delegated regulators, self-regulators, fraudster databases and the 
use of contempt of court in civil courts in dealing with fraudsters. Using data from the 
Ministry of Justice, the number of persons sanctioned for fraud offences are juxtaposed 
against data drawn from the regulatory bodies within the broader ‘fraud justice network’. 
The paper shows that over one million individuals are sanctioned for fraud offences each 
year and the great majority do not trouble the criminal justice system. 
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Introduction  
In 2006 Karstedt and Farrall published an article exposing the widespread potential for the 
majority of ordinary citizens in England and Wales and Germany to engage in a variety of 
fraudulent behaviours they termed ‘crimes of everyday life’ (Karstedt and Farrall, 2006). 
This finding perhaps explains why annual fraud losses in the UK are estimated at £193 billion 
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(Crowe Clark Whitehill, 2017) and the total number of fraud offences, including cyber and 
computer misuse offences is in excess of 4.5 million / year (ONS, 2017).  Others have 
similarly concluded that ordinary citizens frequently engage in acts of dishonest, fraudulent 
behaviour (Basran and Webley, 2013; Hollinger and Clark, 1983; NHSCFSMS, 2006; Whiteley, 
n.d.). These disquieting results have been supported by a wide range of psychological 
experiments which have demonstrated the capacity for ordinary people to be dishonest for 
gain (Ariely, 2012; Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008). The evidence is therefore strong to 
indicate the widespread potential and willingness of ordinary people to engage in fraud, yet 
the criminal justice system in England and Wales obtained just 13,070 convictions in 2015 
(MoJ, 2015). 
In addition to the traditional actors of the criminal justice system, i.e. the police, Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) and the courts, the justice network in the UK includes many 
regulatory bodies with policing and enforcement powers (see Lidstone, 1980; Loader, 2000; 
Hampton, 2005; Macrory, 2006). This justice system provides punishment and redress 
options for victims of fraud beyond the criminal justice system (Levi, 1987; Cook, 1989; Levi, 
2010). Button, Tapley and Lewis (2013) described this as a ‘fraud justice network’ which 
includes ‘…multiple systems or what some would call nodes… including the criminal justice 
system, civil system, as well as some statutory and private organizations which operate 
sometimes as a system, sometimes in parallel and sometimes completely separately.’ 
One of the reasons postulated for the development of the fraud justice network is the 
inability and unwillingness of the criminal justice network to take on fraud cases (Button, 
Tapley and Lewis, 2013; Doig and Levi, 2013). The investigation and prosecution of fraud is 
complex, fragmented, time consuming and absorbs a great deal of manpower (Attorney 
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General, 2006; Smith, Button, Johnston and Frimpong, 2011, p121). As a result, the police in 
England and Wales dedicate just 569 officers to fraud (Home Office, 2015), and a staff of 
369 is only sufficient for the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) to secure 6 convictions (SFO, 2016). 
Fraud investigations very often require specialist contextual knowledge, for example in how 
businesses operate, how financial service companies function and tax regulations. A 
principal advantage of the fraud justice network is that specialist bodies are able to more 
efficiently investigate, adjudicate and prosecute fraud offences. Taking some obvious 
examples, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) specialises in tax fraud, the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) focuses on benefit fraud and the National Health 
Service (NHS) deals with health service fraud (Button, Blackbourn and Tunley, 2015). Further 
examples in the regulation of the professions are the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) 
and the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC). However, other than the statistics produced 
by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), there has been no attempt to gauge the number of 
offenders processed by this broader fraud justice network. 
This paper describes the research undertaken to answer this question. This paper is 
concerned with those regulators which have the capacity to impose criminal or 
administrative sanctions on the general public and on human members of regulated 
professions for fraud offences. The research avoids regulators which only deal with 
organisational practices, for example OFWAT, the water services regulator. Many regulators, 
such as the SRA, supervise individuals and organisations. The research excludes their 
interventions relating to organisations. The research has also not considered the 
motivations of the offenders involved in the different types of frauds or their profile, but 
clearly these are areas in need of further research.  
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A further area of the fraud justice network covered in the research is the ‘fraudster 
database’. Commercial offender registers or databases are a commonly used but somewhat 
opaque form of regulation that has largely escaped the attention of criminologists. Whyte 
(2015) has noted the use of unlawful, secret anti-trade union blacklists in the UK 
construction industry.  However, lawful data sharing services that capture the identities of 
fraudsters have been in operation for several decades. For a fee, these fraudster databases 
assist organisations with their due diligence processes by sharing intelligence on confirmed 
fraudsters. 
The final area examined is contempt of court. Contempt proceedings are emerging as a 
counter-fraud tool used by insurance firms. In these cases the firm prosecutes individuals 
who persist in their pursuit of fraudulent insurance claims, for example Liverpool Victoria 
Insurance v Yavuz & Ors [2017] EWHC 3088 (QB). Contempt of court is a criminal offence 
punishable with imprisonment, but proceedings are held in civil courts without a jury. 
 
Methods  
As fraud covers a wide range of dishonest behaviours, the research first required a 
framework to set out the criteria for inclusion in the analysis. The framework was 
constructed by reference to two UK government fraud taxonomies, the Fraud Act 2006 
(applicable in England and Wales) and the common law. The Home Office and the MoJ use a 
common offence based taxonomy to count the number of offenders in each crime type; it 
classifies over 1,500 crimes (Home Office, 2016; MoJ, 2015). The fraud category includes 63 
separate offences specified by 20 different statutes plus those in common law. It includes 
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general offences under the Fraud Act 2006 and specific offences under, for example, the 
Companies Act 2006, the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 and the Social Security Act 1998. The government’s National Fraud 
Authority (NFA) developed an alternative victim based taxonomy to quantify the losses 
suffered by different groups of victims (NFA, 2013). It includes offences which are not 
explicit in the Home Office taxonomy, for example BBC TV licence evasion, NHS prescription 
charge fraud and transport fare evasion. Offences which were explicitly covered by either 
taxonomy were included in the research. It needs to be emphasised at this point that this 
paper is focused on the regulator and not the offence. It does not analyse offending 
frequencies by specific fraud type. It will therefore include both cyber-enabled and offline 
schemes. The cyber offences are components of the criminal justice statistics and are likely 
to contribute to the database statistics.  
The criteria derived from the Fraud Act 2006, conspiracy and the tort of deceit (McGrath, 
2008, p11) were used to inform the inclusion of offences not explicitly stated in the above 
taxonomies. These criteria, as set out below, were particularly necessary for the profession 
regulator research: 
 Dishonest misrepresentation, e.g. false expenses or invoices; 
 Abuse of position, e.g. accountant diverts client funds into his personal account; 
 Failure to disclose, e.g. solicitor fails to inform lender of fraud in mortgage 
application; 
 Conspiracy, e.g. providing material assistance to a principal fraudster; 
 Gain for self or others or to cause loss to others. 
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Data collection involved two methods. Aggregate statistics were efficiently obtained from 
the 6 government bodies that regulate the public either through published statistics (e.g. 
the HMRC) or by requesting the information (e.g. NHS). This was not possible with the 
profession regulators as they do not classify the cases they handle. The bulk of the research 
effort thus involved finding the profession regulators which deal with fraud and then 
carefully examining their catalogues of judgments to identify and quantify the number of 
relevant cases. A set of criteria was used to limit the scale of the task: 
 A two year census period, 2014 and 2015; 
 Bodies with jurisdiction in England and Wales, excluding bodies specific to Scotland 
and Northern Ireland; 
 Local authorities in relation to non-criminal trading standards work; 
 Bodies which have not pursued fraud cases over the census period; 
 Civil courts, other than contempt of court cases; 
 Ombudsman services as their focus is service complaints, not misconduct; 
 Bodies dealing solely with organisations. 
From an initial list of several hundred bodies, the criteria narrowed the sample frame to 37 
profession regulators. A total of 3,750 cases published by these regulators were carefully 
examined using the above definition criteria to identify and count the fraud cases. In 
addition, government publications and internet searches were used to identify 25 fraudster 
databases. Three database providers engaged with the researchers to provide information 
about their operations and the number of cases they handle. Excluding the police, the CPS 
and the SFO, a total of 68 regulatory bodies were included in the sample frame. 
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Findings 
In addition to the traditional criminal justice actors, i.e. the police, the CPS, the SFO and the 
courts, the research found 68 organisations that penalised individuals for fraud offences 
over the two census years. The following sections set out the number of individuals 
sanctioned for fraud by these bodies over the census period. 43 of these organisations are 
recognisably conventional regulators, for example Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) and the General Dental Council (GDC). Examination of the constitutions and 
purposes of these regulators lead to a simple but useful classification: government 
regulators (n=19), delegated regulators (n=13) and self-regulators (n=11). The distinctions 
between the three categories are somewhat blurred, partly due to the hybrid constitutional 
arrangements of some of the regulators. The following sections introduce and define the 
three regulatory types. 
The remaining 25 organisations are companies that sell fraudster database and data sharing 
services. The findings focus on 3 companies that were willing to engage with the research, 
Cifas, the Insurance Fraud Bureau and National Hunter, and briefly describes their 
procedures. The final section introduces the contribution of contempt of court proceedings 
to the fraud justice network. 
i. Government regulators 
For the purposes of this paper, government regulators are defined as those government 
departments, subsidiary agencies or wholly owned government corporations which conduct 
regulatory functions that include sanctioning persons for fraud related behaviours.  The 
research found 19 regulators which sanction individuals for fraud offences (Table 1). In total 
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they sanctioned an average of 902,028 individuals for fraud offences over the census period; 
19% were pursued through the courts, 81% by non-criminal procedures. This sector can be 
further sub-divided into two groups: the 5 regulators that protect the financial interests of 
the government, the HMRC and the DWP being obvious examples, and the 14 that are 
concerned with public protection. The latter group includes the Insolvency Service which 
deals with individuals in bankruptcy, insolvent businesses and fraudulent company 
directors. It also includes 13 profession regulators which are entirely independent of the 
professions they supervise. The Financial Conduct Authority (formerly the Financial Services 
Authority), for example, is a wholly owned government corporation that protects commerce 
and the public; it has considerable statutory powers that enable it to enquire into and 
sanction professionals in the financial services sector. In a prominent example, the then 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) found that Mr. Ravi Sinha, a senior executive in a private 
equity firm had fraudulently obtained just under £1.4 million (FSA, 2012). The FSA banned 
Sinha from working in financial services and ordered him to pay a £3 million financial 
penalty. There was, however, no criminal prosecution, raising questions of equity that the 
Daily Mirror (2012) summed up in a front page headline: ‘Call this justice? City banker steals 
£1.4m... no charge. Shop worker steals £10k... 9 months' jail’. In another prominent example 
Jonathan Burrows was found to have evaded rail fares worth £43,000 (Guardian, 2014). 
Burrows was sued by Southeastern Railways and settled out of court. Although the fraud 
had no direct link to his work as an investment banker, he was banned by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) under their “fit and proper” test. 
Although government regulators predominantly focus on non-criminal administrative 
sanctions, some also pursue criminal prosecutions, most notably TV Licensing, the HMRC 
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and the Department for Work and Pensions. TV licence evasion is a species of fraud (NFA, 
2013). The BBC is a government corporation and TV Licensing is an arm of the BBC that 
collects and enforces the payment of licence fees. The administration of TV Licensing is 
contracted out to Capita Business Services Ltd. Thus, whilst the regulatory responsibility sits 
within a government owned body, the administration of the regulations is within the private 
sector. Similarly UK Anti-Doping (UKAD), a government body within the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport, contracts out the tribunal functions of the National Anti-Doping 
Panel (NAPD) to a private company, Sports Resolutions UK 
(https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk/services). 
It is notable that the focus of the top five government enforcers is government finances and 
together they account for over 99% of government cases. The combined annual rate for the 
three highest volume enforcers is 869,045 cases, 96% of the total. TV Licensing pursues 
evaders though the Magistrates Court (TV Licensing, u.d.) leading to over 160,000 guilty 
verdicts (MoJ, 2015). Fare evasion was defined by the NFA (2013) as a species of fraud. It is 
also frequently dealt with by the criminal courts, particularly serial offenders. For instance, 
in one very high profile case a barrister was convicted of fraud by false representation under 
the Fraud Act for fare evasion on his railway commute into London amounting to almost 
£6,000 (Guardian, 2016). An FOI request revealed the number of penalty charges (100,113) 
issued by Transport for London (TfL) for fare evasion. This only represents TfL’s transport 
network in London. TfL is a government body and open to FOI requests, whereas most other 
providers are private and beyond the scope of FOI. The fare evasion estimate thus 
represents only a fraction of this type of fraud offending. 
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The number of penalty charges (606,063) issued by the National Health Service Business 
Services Authority (NHSBSA) was disclosed in an FOI response.  The NHS penalty charge 
regime is set out in the National Health Service (Penalty Charge) Regulations 1999. A person 
found to have wrongfully claimed for exemption from treatment or prescription charges is 
liable to a penalty charge up to five times the original amount to a maximum of £100. In 
England there are several categories of persons who are exempt from NHS charges including 
children, those aged 16-18 and in fulltime education, those receiving specified benefits, 
pregnant women and those aged over 60. Tempting opportunities for dishonesty arise from 
the way that the processes are organised. The high volume of transactions, complex 
bureaucracies and insufficient checks at the point of treatment mean that exemption claims 
are usually honoured at the point of provision. Thorough after-the-event checks by the 
NHSBSA identify the false claimants. 
Table 1. Government regulators: number of sanctioned fraudsters (average 2014-2015) 
   Number cases / year 
Government 
Regulator 
Regulatory 
Focus 
Fraud Focus Criminal 
Non-
criminal 
Total 
NHS Business Services 
Authority (NHSBSA) (1) 
Public 
False free 
treatment claims 
 606,063 606,063 
TV Licensing (2) Public TV license evasion 162,869  162,869 
Transport for London 
(TfL) (3) 
Public Fare evasion  100,113 100,113 
Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP) (4) 
Public 
False welfare 
benefit claims 
6,105 10,155 16,260 
Her Majesty's Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC) 
(5) 
Public Tax fraud 716 14,760 15,476 
Insolvency Service (IS) 
(6) 
Public 
Company 
directors and 
bankrupt persons 
 1,122 1,122 
Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA)  
Profession 
Financial services 
personnel 
8 17 25 
National College for Profession Teachers in  23 23 
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Teaching and 
Leadership (NCTL) 
England 
Health and Care 
Professions Council 
(HCPC) 
Profession 
Social workers 
and health 
professionals 
other than 
doctors and 
nurses 
 22 22 
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) 
/ National Anti-Doping 
Panel (NADP) 
Profession 
Athletes and 
supporting staff 
 21 21 
Education Workforce 
Council (Wales) 
Profession Teachers in Wales  9 9 
Gambling Commission Profession Casino employees  9 9 
Gangmasters Licensing 
Authority (GLA) 
Profession Gangmasters 6  6 
Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA) 
Profession Airline workers  3 3 
Care Council for Wales 
(CCW) 
Profession 
Social, care and 
teaching 
professionals in 
Wales 
 2 2 
Judicial Conduct 
Investigations Office 
(JCIO) 
Profession Judiciary  2 2 
Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) 
Profession 
High profile 
accountancy 
cases 
 1 1 
Independent 
Parliamentary 
Standards Authority 
(IPSA) 
Profession MPs  1 1 
Maritime and 
Coastguard agency 
(MCA) 
Profession 
Shipping 
company 
employees 
1  1 
  Total 169,723 732,305 902,028 
(1) NHSBSA data from FOI. 
(2) TV Licensing data from Ministry of Justice (2015). 
(3) TfL data from FOI. 
(4) Department for Work and Pensions (2014, 2015) 
(5) HMRC data from FOI and http://hmrcdigitalpilots.com/ 
(6) Insolvency Service data from https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/insolvency-service-
enforcement-outcomes-january-to-march-2015 
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ii. Delegated regulators 
Delegated profession regulators are authorised by government, usually through statutes, 
but are entirely independent of the government with respect to ownership, governance and 
practice. Importantly, like the government profession regulators, they are also independent 
of the professions they supervise: they have no advocacy role in representing the interests 
of their professions. Their primary role is to set professional standards and to protect the 
interests of the public when members fail to meet those standards due to incompetency or 
misconduct. They have the powers to investigate and sanction members, which typically 
include restrictions on practice, warnings, fines and professional exclusion. Table 2 lists the 
13 delegated regulators that dealt with fraud cases in the professions during the research 
sample period, at an overall average of 226 / year.   
Table 2. Delegated regulators: number of sanctioned fraudsters (average 2014-2015) 
Delegated Regulator Professions 
Number cases / 
year (non-
criminal) 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) Nurses and midwifes 86 
General Medical Council (GMC) +                                        
Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service (MPTS) 
Doctors 56 
Solicitors Regulation authority (SRA) +                         
Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal  (SDT) 
Solicitors 33 
General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) Pharmacists 18 
Phonepay Plus 
Premium rate telephone 
service personnel 
10 
General Dental Council (GDC) Dentists 7 
Bar Standards board (BSB) +                                                               
Bar Tribunals and Adjudication Service (BTAS) 
Barristers 4 
CILEx Regulation Legal executives 4 
General Optical Council (GOC) Opticians 4 
Architects Registration Board (ARB) Architects 1 
Costs Lawyers Standards Board (CLSB) Costs lawyers 1 
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General Chiropractic Council (GCC) Chiropractors 1 
General Osteopathic Council (GOsC) Osteopaths 1 
 Total 226 
 
iii. Self-regulators 
Self-regulators are organisations with responsibility for all three aspects of professional 
supervision: they are professional associations which have an advocacy role in representing 
the interests of its members, they investigate incompetency and misconduct, and they 
impose controls and sanctions. The research identified 11 self-regulators that have 
sanctioned members for fraud (Table 3). The most prominent self-regulators are the 
accountancy associations and sporting bodies with sanction rates of 44/year and 16/year 
respectively. Some of the offences are serious, involving substantial sums of money. For 
example, an accountant was struck off by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountant 
(ACCA) for submitting £25,000 of fraudulent expense claims over 2 years and assisting 
clients in illegal tax evasion (ACCA/23-11-2015 Martin Jeffs). The sporting world produces 
high profile cases, for example, snooker player Stephen Lee and cricketer Danish Kaneria, 
who were both banished by their respective regulators for match-fixing offences (BBC, 2013; 
ECB v Kaneria, 2013). 
Table 3. Self-regulators: number of sanctioned fraudsters (average 2014-2015) 
Self-regulator Profession 
Number cases / 
year (non-
criminal) 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
(ACCA) 
Accountants 33 
British Horseracing Authority (BHA) Horseracing personnel 10 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW) 
Chartered Accountants 10 
Football Association (FA) 
Football players and other 
personnel 
4 
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Institute of Faculty of Actuaries (IFoA) Actuaries 2 
Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) Surveyors 2 
Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants (CIMA) 
Management accountants 1 
Chartered Insurance Institute (CII) Insurance professionals 1 
National Federation of Property Professionals 
(NFoPP) 
Property management, 
estate agents, valuers, 
auctioneers 
1 
Rugby Football League (RFL) 
Rugby league players and 
other personnel 
1 
Rugby Football Union (RFU) 
Rugby Union players and 
other personnel 
1 
 Total 66 
 
iv. Fraudster databases  
Fraudster databases have been in operation for several decades. The aim of these data 
sharing services is to help organisations identify and avoid fraudsters in their customer 
engagement and recruitment processes. One of the most prominent service providers, Cifas, 
was originally called the Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System. It was formed in 1988 by a 
consortium of retail credit providers who shared information about credit application 
fraudsters detected by operations (https://www.cifas.org.uk/about-cifas/what-is-cifas). 
Concerns about the legal basis for sharing personal data led the UK government to place 
fraud databases on a statutory footing in the Serious Crime Act 2007 (SCA) and to dissolve 
any conflict with the Data Protection Act 1998. The SCA defines authorised data sharing 
providers as Specified Anti-Fraud Organisations (SAFO). There are now 11 SAFOs: BAE 
Systems, Call Credit, Cifas, Dun and Bradstreet, Equifax, Experian, Insurance Fraud Bureau 
(IFB), Insurance Fraud Investigators Group (IFIG), National Hunter, Synectics and 
Telecommunications UK Fraud Forum (TUFF) (ICO, 2015). 
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These database systems have emerged as a form of community sourced and shared 
intelligence that assists both the private and public sector in combatting fraud. 
Organisations pay subscriptions for membership access to the data. Members also 
contribute to the communities by supplying the personal details of customers they have 
judged to be fraudsters according to the bespoke rules of each database provider. Cifas, the 
IFB and National Hunter volunteered information on their operations and the number of 
individuals registered on their databases. The information is set out in Table 3. Cifas is the 
most transparent provider with 400 subscribing members drawn mainly from the financial 
services sector, but also includes retailers, charities and government departments - the 
Home Office signed up in 2017 (https://www.cifas.org.uk/about-cifas/what-is-cifas). Cifas 
operates two databases. The National Fraud Database is a register of members’ customers 
who have been identified as fraudsters. Their Internal Fraud Database is a register of 
employees, job applicants, agency workers and contractors who have committed fraud 
against members. Names remain on both databases for 6 years. Individuals can view their 
own data and can challenge their inclusion on the systems.  
Table 4. Fraudsters registered in UK databases 
Database Process Description 
Number of Persons 
on Database in 2014 
Cifas: Internal Fraud 
Database 
 
Cifas hosts an employment database for 
subscribing scheme members who are mainly 
drawn from the financial services sector. 
 
Members who experience an internal fraud by a 
member of staff place the offender’s identity on 
this database provided the case meets the Cifas 
standards and the employee has been informed. 
The record remains on the register for six years. 
Members can access and search the database. 
 
In order to file an Internal Fraud record, the 
information must be factually correct and 
accurate. The standard of proof is that in all cases, 
736 
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Database Process Description 
Number of Persons 
on Database in 2014 
members MUST be in a position to make a formal 
complaint to the police or other relevant law 
enforcement agency. Members must have carried 
out checks of sufficient depth to satisfy this 
standard of proof and must retain a record of the 
checks. The offence must be identifiable.  
 
Whenever members’ searches reveal the 
inclusion of individuals in the register, members 
must inform the individuals and provide them 
with advice on challenging their inclusion.  
Cifas: National Fraud 
Database 
 
Cifas hosts a customer database for subscribing 
scheme members from a range of sectors, 
including telecommunications, retail, insurance, 
public sector and financial services. 
 
Members who experience fraud by a customer 
can place the offender’s identity on this database 
provided the case meets the Cifas standards. The 
record remains on the register for six years. 
Members can access and search the database. 
 
The database is also used to protect identity fraud 
victims by recording details of fake identities and 
repeat victims. 
134,749 
 
Insurance Fraud 
Register  
 
The IFB hosts the IFR database for insurance 
firms. Members who experience a fraud by a 
customer or claimant place the offender’s identity 
on this database provided the case meets the IFB 
standards. The record remains on the register for 
six years. Members can access and search the 
database.  
‘Thousands’ but 
exact numbers not 
revealed.  
National Hunter National Hunter is a network of separate in-house 
databases operated by members. The databases 
are linked and all are searchable. Members who 
identify a fraud add identity information to their 
own databases and become visible to all network 
users. Information remains on the databases for 6 
years. Members are drawn largely from financial 
services.  
98,104 
 
 
v. Contempt of Court  
The final area to be considered is contempt of court. This route has been used by insurance 
firms against some insurance fraudsters. In these cases the defendant to a civil claim 
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initiates the contempt proceedings and ‘prosecutes’ the action when the claimant deceives 
the civil court by presenting false statements. In effect the roles of the parties become 
reversed: the claimant turns into a defendant facing the prospect of imprisonment as a 
result of a criminal prosecution by an insurer. It is important to note that, although the 
prosecution is criminal, the proceedings are under jurisdiction of a civil court without a jury. 
Contempt of court is covered by civil law procedure rules CPR 81 (MoJ, 2016a and b). Under 
Rule 32.14 it states that: 
Proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against a person if he makes, or 
causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth 
without an honest belief in its truth (MoJ, 2016b). 
Insurers have started to use contempt of court in a relatively small number of cases largely 
around exaggerated or entirely fabricated personal injuries arising from car crashes or ‘slip 
and trip’ incidents at work and elsewhere (Button and Brooks, 2016). From searches of legal 
databases, law reports and press reports, it is estimated that 12 individuals were 
successfully prosecuted for contempt of court in both 2014 and 2015. 
The first notable case which opened this route for insurers was Joanne Kirk v Carol Walton 
(2009). In this case, Kirk claimed that a real accident, in which her car experienced a rear 
end shunt, had triggered health problems leading her to give up work and the inability to 
walk more than ten yards. She had claimed for £800,000 and settled for £25,000. However 
the insurer subsequently proved that her claims were false in contempt proceedings. Kirk 
was fined £2,500, had to pay her own £125,000 legal bill and half the defendant’s legal costs 
(Guildhall Chambers, n.d.). The first case involving a completely contrived accident was 
brought in 2012. Samina Bashir admitted the offence and was given a 6 week suspended 
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prison sentence. Her husband and parents also received suspended sentences. They were 
ordered to pay £17,000 costs (Clyde and Co, 2012). 
 
Analysis and Discussion  
Edwin Sutherland observed 75 years ago that official crime statistics are a fruitless resource 
for understanding the true prevalence of white-collar crime, partly because the response to 
such crimes are far more likely to be within the purview of administrative and regulatory 
bodies (Sutherland, 1940). This section of the paper collates the regulator and criminal 
justice offending data to test Sutherland’s assertion. The analysis is based on published, 
confirmed outcomes. It excludes the unreported incidents of fraud which contribute to the 
high attrition rate between occurrence and confirmation by a court or regulator (Button, 
Lewis and Tapley, 2014; Button and Tunley, 2015). It further omits any the cases handled 
privately by regulators.  
To put the scale of officially recorded fraud offending in perspective, it is useful to first 
examine the criminal justice offending statistics. Table 5 shows the total number of proven 
offenders handled by the criminal justice system of England and Wales is in 2014 and 2015 
(Ministry of Justice, 2015). The average for the two years is 1,424,688. The average number 
of proven fraud offenders is 15,708 or 1.1% of the total. This figure is inconsistent with the 
behavioural frequencies indicated by Karstedt and Farrell (2006) and with the values 
reported by Crowe Clark Whitehill and Experian (2017), £193 billion per year in the UK, and 
by ACFE (2016), 5% of GDP. It is also a tiny fraction of the 4.5 million / year fraud related 
crimes estimated by the Crime Survey of England and Wales (ONS, 2017), and this figure 
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excludes fraud against organisations. The attrition rate between the number of offences 
actually perpetrated and the number proven to the criminal standard is clearly well in 
excess of 99%. 
Table 5: Proven offenders in the criminal justice system in England and Wales 
 All offenders Fraud offenders 
Year Cautions Convictions Total Cautions Convictions Total % of all 
2014 241,229 1,187,085 1,428,314 2,686 13,395 16,081 1.1% 
2015 192,662 1,228,400 1,421,062 2,265 13,070 15,335 1.1% 
Average 216,946 1,207,743 1,424,688 2,476 13,233 15,708 1.1% 
 15% 85% 100% 16% 84% 100%  
 
Previous research has identified a number of reasons for the high attrition rate including:  
people being unaware they are victims, victims not reporting, difficulties reporting incidents 
and a lack of interest and capability within the criminal justice system (Button et al 2014; 
Button and Tunley, 2015). That such a high volume crime results in only 1.1% of proven 
criminal offenders underlines its lack of priority in the criminal justice system. This 
submissive criminal justice policy is further emphasised by comparing the 617,618 
confirmed fraud offences recorded by the UK government (ONS, 2016) in Table 6 with the 
15,708 proven in Table 5, an attrition rate of 97.5%. 
Table 6: Recorded fraud offences in England and Wales 2014 and 2015 
Reporting 
body 
2014 2015 
Action Fraud 224,683 224,682 
Cifas 254,843 295,525 
FFA UK 115,243 97,411 
Total 594,769 617,618 
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The crime classification taxonomy used by the Home Office (2016) and the MoJ (2015) 
makes a small, but relevant contribution to the attrition problem. The taxonomy categorises 
in excess of 1,500 offences. The fraud category includes 63 offences under 20 statutes and 
other common law crimes. However, it excludes TV licence evasion although it is prosecuted 
through the Magistrates courts by TV Licensing and was defined by the NFA as a fraud act 
(NFA, 2013). There may be other offences buried within the Home Office system that ought 
to be re-categorised as species of fraud. This is beyond the scope of this paper but warrants 
further examination. 
Adding the 162,869 summary convictions secured by TV Licensing to the criminal statistics 
(MoJ, 2015), the number of proven offenders processed by the criminal justice system 
jumps to 178,577, an eleven-fold increase. Table 7 lists the average number of proven 
offenders for 2014 and 2015 broken down by enforcement agency. The analysis leads to 
two important observations. Firstly, the government classification and counting rules distort 
and under-represent the official fraud figures. Secondly, the contribution of the regulators 
far exceeds the ‘normal’ gateway into the criminal justice system via the police and the 
Criminal Prosecution Service. The contribution of the police via cautions (2,476) and the 
courts (6,373) to the total proven criminal offending statistics is at best just 5%. 
Table 7: Proven criminal fraud offenders (average of 2014-15) 
Enforcement body # /y % 
Police / CPS 6,373 3.6% 
DWP 6,105 3.4% 
Police cautions 2,476 1.4% 
HMRC 716 0.4% 
SFO 11 0.0% 
FCA 8 0.0% 
GLA 6 0.0% 
MCA 1 0.0% 
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Contempt (civil) 12 0.0% 
Sub-total (1) 15,708 8.8% 
TV Licensing 162,869 91.2% 
Total 178,577 100.0% 
(1)
 Rounding errors from average calculations 
 
Table 8 draws all the criminal and regulatory data together, categorising it according to 
enforcement type. Over 1 million individuals are sanctioned each year for fraudulent 
behaviour, a 67 fold increase over the criminal justice statistics. It is not known how many of 
these individuals are multiple offenders. Despite this caution, it is highly likely that this is a 
serious underestimate. The research was unable, for example, to access all the database 
services and all the private sector transport companies. It excludes cases handled privately 
by regulators and cases not brought to their attention. It further omits employee frauds 
managed solely through disciplinary processes (Meerts and Dorn, 2009). 
 
The results clearly confirm Sutherland’s (1940) assertion that the majority of detected and 
confirmed white-collar crimes, in the present case fraud, bypass the criminal justice system: 
just 1.5% are outputs of criminal justice and less than 1% (8,860/y) follow the traditional 
route involving the police and prosecutors. The number of convictions obtained by insurers 
for contempt of court is also very low at just 12/year. It appears that contempt proceedings 
are brought more for symbolic reasons. They have a deterrence value in that cases are 
reported in the press (BBC, 2017). They also enable insurers to substantiate the fraud 
disclaimers in their terms and conditions.  
 
Reflecting Karstedt and Farrall’s (2006) research, the data shows that the vast majority of 
cases are every day, high volume, low value offences handled by regulatory bodies. 83% of 
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the offences involve the evasion of small charges: TV licences, NHS treatments and TfL 
public transport fares. Furthermore, 87% target the protection of government finances. The 
government’s response has been the creation of high volume penalty factories designed to 
prevent the widespread, low level immorality turning into an epidemic. The practice 
borrows from the behavioural sciences in aiming to nudge individuals into compliance by 
reminding them of their social responsibilities (Benartzi et al, 2017). 
 
Table 8: Total number of sanctioned fraud offenders (average of 2014-15) 
Enforcement type Justice route 
# 
offenders 
% 
 
% 
 
Criminal 
TV Licensing 162,869 15.6% 
17.1% 
Police + CPS + SFO 8,860 0.8% 
DWP 6,105 0.6% 
HMRC 716 0.1% 
Government 
profession regulators 
15 0.0% 
Contempt of court 
(civil courts) 
12 0.0% 
Regulatory - general public 
NHS 606,063 57.9% 
70.0% 
TfL 100,113 9.6% 
HMRC 14,760 1.4% 
DWP 10,155 1.0% 
Insolvency Service 1,122 0.1% 
Regulatory - professions 
Government regulators 110 0.01% 
0.03% Delegated regulators 226 0.02% 
Self-regulators 66 0.01% 
Database record Cifas 135,485 12.9% 12.9% 
Total (1) 1,046,675 100% 100% 
(1)
 Rounding errors from average calculations 
 
Although the penalty factory methods are probably unsuitable for even modestly complex 
frauds, there may be aspects that are applicable to other forms of fraud. The tax gap 
appears to be fixed at about £36 billion / year, including £16 billion of fraud (HMRC, 2016). 
Welfare benefit fraud is also a stubborn problem, costing over £2.4 billion / year (Crowe 
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Clark Whitehill, 2017). Further research would be required to determine whether these 
problems would benefit from any of the operational and behavioural science features of the 
penalty factory.  
 
Turning to the professions, the research has identified 37 profession regulators which have 
demonstrated a capacity to sanction fraudulent members. The combined average of the two 
census years was 417 offenders sanctioned by these regulators, 15 (4%) through the courts 
and 402 (96%) by non-criminal regulatory methods. The data suggests that the delegated 
regulators are the most active (226 / 54%), followed by the government regulators (125 / 
30%) and finally the self-regulators (66 / 16%). The research also found the regulators 
sanction a further 189 offenders each year as an automatic consequence of criminal 
convictions via one of the prosecuting bodies. They are included in the criminal figures in 
Table 7 as this analysis focuses on first instance findings, not their consequences. 
 
Overall the profession regulators appear to make a surprisingly minor contribution to the 
fraud justice network, especially considering the numbers of people employed in these 
professions and the opportunities they have to commit fraud. The accountancy regulator 
ACCA, for example, has 633,000 members (ACCA, 2015), yet only sanctions 33 members 
each year for fraudulent behaviour. These findings are likely to be an underestimate as 
there is an unknown number of persons handled privately by regulators through internal 
administrative processes without recourse to a hearing or published determination. The 
offences committed by the professionals ranged from minor expense fraud to multi-million 
pound investment frauds. Whilst the latter attract professional banishment and very high 
financial penalties, the majority of these serious offenders still enjoy their freedom under 
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these regulatory regimes. On its face, it seems iniquitous that some benefit fraudsters are 
stigmatised with a criminal label and imprisoned, whilst the lives of some high worth, 
serious fraudsters are only disrupted. Examining the effectiveness of these regulatory 
groups and the levels of differentia justice through the relative equity of their punishments 
is beyond the scope of this paper but would constitute worthy further research. 
 
One of the private sector’s responses to high volume fraud threats has been the creation of 
databases to assist with organisations’ due diligence procedures. The data sharing sector of 
the fraud justice network is represented in the analysis solely by the combined figure for the 
two Cifas databases (135,485). This figure is therefore likely to be a serious underestimate. 
The National Hunter data is excluded because there is a high risk of duplication with the 
Cifas data and no data was available for other systems. 
 
These data sharing services are undoubtedly a powerful counter-fraud tool. It is more likely, 
for example, that fraudulent insurance claimants will end up in a fraudster database than 
face contempt proceedings.  Cifas claims that it has enabled the prevention of over £1 
billion in fraud losses (https://www.cifas.org.uk/about-cifas/what-is-cifas). However there 
are concerning aspects to these community systems. They entirely rely on employees of the 
targeted victims making objective, accurate assessments. As such, they are a form of 
summary vigilante justice which penalise individuals by blocking or increasing the cost of 
access to financial products and other services. They sometimes make mistakes with 
debilitating consequences. The BBC’s Money Box programme highlighted the case of a 
student who had been placed on the Cifas fraudster database by mistake, and who as a 
consequence had his existing bank accounts closed and was unable to open another account 
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(Howard, 2012). The student complained, ‘I was made to go to the counter and clear my 
account in cash. You feel like a criminal when you're marched over and marched out the 
door without being given any reason as to why your account is being closed’. His father’s 
intervention proved it was the bank’s mistake. The Chair of the then Financial Services 
Authority’s Consumer Panel, commented upon the case, ‘You cannot find out what you're 
accused of, you cannot plead your case and you find yourself unable to open a bank account 
and nothing can be done about it. What's happening goes absolutely against the rules of 
natural justice’ (Howard, 2012). 
 
Fraudster database and data sharing services are emerging as a quasi-regulatory method of 
penalising individuals, often without their knowledge. Our research identified 25 databases 
operating in the UK, 14 of which are not SAFO registered under the Serious Crime Act 2007. 
Further research is required to understand how these data matching products of the digital 
era impact on society, particularly with respect to the tensions between crime prevention 
and privacy, how they operate, how accurate they are and how they are themselves 
regulated. 
 
Conclusion: The Dominance of Non-Criminal Justice 
It is evident from the 2014-2015 census data that the non-criminal justice parts of the ‘fraud 
justice network’ dominate in bringing fraud offenders to some form of justice. Excluding TV 
licence evasion, the criminal justice system accounts for just 1.5% of the 1 million offenders 
sanctioned for fraud each year. Less than 1% of proven offenders are handled by the 
traditional route through the police and the CPS. Including the prosecutions brought by TV 
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Licensing, the criminal justice statistics still only accounts for 17% of sanctions. Regulatory 
bodies have assumed a dominant role in the justice network, particularly in relation to high 
volume, low value transactional offences. The paper characterises these regulators as 
‘penalty factories’. The dominance illustrated in the findings is likely to be a significant 
underestimation as the research did not explore all areas of the fraud justice network: it was 
not possible, for example, to obtain further fare evasion data from private transport 
companies and all the database services. The emergence of these data sharing companies, 
which has to date escaped the interest of criminologists, raises a number of important social 
and privacy questions which deserves further research.  
The paper provides further support for the findings of Karstedt and Farrall (2006), the ONS 
(2016) and others that indicate a high capacity for fraud amongst the general population. 
Fraud is a very common problem and the criminal justice system only deals with the tip of 
the iceberg. It raises a number of significant questions regarding access to justice, equity of 
punishments, equitable remedies for victims, the performance of the regulators and the 
regulation of the database services. 
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